Developing countries, particularly those in Asia, are fast adopting industrial pollution control standards similar to those in developed countries. However, formal regulation has been greatly hampered by the absence of clear and legally binding rules; limited institutional capacity; lack of appropriate equipment and trained personnel; and inadequate information on emissions. At present, the government-imposed 'price of pollution' is nearly zero for many manufacturing facilities in these economies.
ii insurmountable barrier to clean production in poor countries.
Our strong results on ownership, competitiveness and income also show that policy matters a great deal for clean production. The current wave of privatization implies declining significance for the pollution intensity of public enterprises. Deregulation during the 1980's has presumably increased plant-level efficiency in the private sector, with significant improvements in environmental performance. Per capita incomes are now advancing steadily in many Asian and Latin American countries, raising the possibility of stronger local pressure on many polluting facilities.
In the latter context, however, we must introduce a cautionary note. Our results suggest that communities whose citizens are mostly poor, poorly educated or members of marginalized minority groups may have little ability to use the available channels of informal regulation. Significance for these factors would establish a clear case of 'environmental injustice.' To compensate, national regulators may want to consider strategies for enhancing community participation in pollution control, as well as targeting of regulation on the problems of poor communities.
INTRODUCTION
Industrial pollution has become a serious problem in many developing countries. Its costs include serious damage to human health and ecosystems, and direct economic costs for households and businesses. Calkins et al. (1994) estimate the yearly health damage from air and water pollution in Jakarta, Indonesia alone to be in excess of $500 million. Margulis (1992) documents a probable IQ loss of several points for thousands of children exposed to airborne lead in Mexico City, and similar findings for Bangkok have prompted the government of Thailand to mandate an immediate switch to unleaded gasoline. 2 See Wheeler (1992) for a summary of the 'stages of regulatory development,' as suggested by the history of several industrial and developing countries. Dasgupta et. al. (1995) have recently attempted to quantify international differences in environmental policy and performance. 3 A concentration standard is specified as an intensity in the medium of release (e.g., allowable kilograms of biological oxygen demand per kiloliter of waste water). A volume standard is specified as an intensity per unit of output (e.g., allowable kilograms of biological oxygen demand per ton of wood pulp). 4 These specify actual pollution control equipment to be installed. 5 These have included concentration, volume and technology standards. enforcement problems in developing countries. Resource scarcity may prevent policy makers from establishing comprehensive monitoring procedures. Moreover, the enforcement of environmental standards generally remains very weak. 6 Under such conditions, a conventional analysis would predict high pollution loads from plants in pollution-intensive sectors.
In fact, a small but growing body of empirical work suggests that this proposition is not correct. In a small survey exercise, Huq and Wheeler (1992) Indonesia is another Southeast Asian economy with historically weak regulation.
Nonetheless, recently-gathered data reveal the same pattern (Afsah, 1995 Organic water pollutants are oxidized by naturally-occuring microorganisms. Biological oxygen demand (BOD) removes dissolved oxygen from the water and can seriously damage some fish species which have adapted to the previous dissolved oxygen level. Organic water pollutants can also accelerate the growth of algae, which will crowd out other plant species. The eventual death and decomposition of the algae is another source of oxygen depletion as well as noxious smells and unsightly scum. The most common measure for BOD is the amount (kg.) of oxygen used by micro-organisms to oxidize the organic waste in a standard sample of pollutant during a five-day period (hence, '5-day BOD'). (Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993) or on work which relates national policies to changes in the balance between "dirty" and "clean" sectors or technologies across countries (Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; Martin and Wheeler, 1992; . The latter work, however, relies on sector-and technology-specific pollution intensities estimated from U.S. data and does not reflect actual emissions in other countries. More systematic evidence for developing countries is just beginning to emerge.
In a recent econometric analysis of BOD emissions from Indonesian factories, Pargal and Wheeler (1995) find that several plant characteristics significantly affect pollution intensity.
These include operating scale, vintage, efficiency and ownership. Their results are also 9 Three years ago, a California coastal pulp mill was fined and forced to install abatement equipment after local surfers developed skin lesions from contact with its untreated raw effluent in the Pacific. Laplante and Rilstone (1994) note that BOD and SS (suspended solids) pollution from pulp and paper mills in Québec violates environmental standards at least 38% of the time.
consistent with widespread 'informal regulation:' Where the state functions poorly as a regulatory agent, local communities, under some circumstances, have struck their own Coasian bargains with neighboring factories. Leverage in negotiations is provided by social pressure on workers and managers; adverse publicity; the threat (or use) of violence; or recourse to civil law.
While the Pargal/Wheeler results are certainly suggestive, they are subject to some important caveats. First, the sample is limited to one country (albeit spread across a highly varied set of provinces). Second, the sample plants are spread across many sectors; sector controls are limited to dummy variables for a few well-represented activities. Third, only end-ofpipe emissions are observed. Thus, it is not clear how much of the variation in BOD is due to actual abatement and how much is due to subsectoral variation in product lines. This is particularly important for evaluation of the informal regulation hypothesis. Higher pollution intensity might simply reflect the differential location of highly polluting facilities in poor communities, not explicit abatement efforts. This would certainly reflect differential community power, but would not imply that such power provides important leverage for pollution control.
In this paper, we reverse the Pargal/Wheeler approach. Rather than estimating emissions equations across many sectors in one country, we analyze explicitly-observed abatement activity in one sector --pulp and paper --across several countries. We also distinguish between possible Pigouvian and Coasion interpretations of abatement. In Section 2 of the paper, we review the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches and introduce the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' regulation. Section 3 presents our analysis of the plant-level data. Section 4 summarizes the paper.
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PIGOUVIAN vs. COASIAN REGULATION
The Pigouvian approach places responsibility for an externality on its generator (the polluter) and imposes a pollution tax (effluent fee) as the policy prescription. Its optimality rests on a set of restrictive neoclassical assumptions.
10 Most importantly, the Pigouvian approach does not address the reciprocal nature of externalities. Nor does it analyze the abatement behavior that will be induced by the Pigouvian tax.
In contrast, the Coasian approach assumes that an externality is reciprocal (i.e., both polluter and pollutee cause the externality 11 ); that legal rules and institutions should change to efficiently internalize the externality; and that policy makers should focus upon the dynamic issue of eliminating (abating) the externality. By incorporating these issues into the analysis, the
Coasian approach arrives at optimal policy prescriptions which generally dominate the Pigouvian results.
12
Because formal regulation is often weak, we hypothesize that abatement efforts in developing countries may have significant Coasian elements. At the core of this issue lies the question of effective political constituency: Have centralized governmental regulations and 10 See Baumol [1972] . This optimality of the Pigouvian tax holds whether participants merge or operate independently. Buchanan [1969] and Davis and Whinston [1973] question this optimality in the case of monopoly and/or oligopoly. However, for a workably large number of participants, the Pigouvian results are unassailable.
11
More specifically, the externality would not exist if the pollutee had located elsewhere. In the law, this is called "coming to the nuisance". See Cooter and Ulen [1988] , p. 181.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis makes use of data gathered as part of a 1992 World Bank field survey of 26 plants in the pulp and paper industry. The plants were distributed throughout Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Thailand. The survey gathered the following information about each plant: n
The process technology in place. Four processes were in operation: stone ground; soda; kraft sulphate and sulphite; and waste-paper-based pollution. In our analysis, we characterize the stone ground process as "clean" because it does not use polluting chemicals.
n Ownership in three categories: state-owned enterprises (SOE), domestic privatelyowned enterprises (POE) and multinational enterprises (MNC).
n Characterization of geographical location by degree of urbanization: Big city (population greater than 1 million), small city (population less than 1 million), or rural area.
n The size of the plant measured by total employment. n Whether foreign financing and/or donor aid supported plant construction.
n The existence of local pressure to abate observed pollution.
n The cost competitiveness of the plant relative to other plants in the domestic market.
n The pollution abatement efforts undertaken by the plant. The focus of this measure for the most part is end-of-pipe abatement.
To this data base, we have added the following information about the economic and regulatory environment in which each plant operated:
n The standard of living in the country, measured as per capita income at purchasing power parity; n The extent of formal emissions regulation; n Indices of informal regulatory pressure.
The available information set does not include the pollution abatement efforts undertaken by other local parties in response to pollution at the plant. Thus, our results can only provide suggestive evidence about the significance of Coasian elements.
Model Variables
For this analysis, we have used the available information to develop indices of abatement efforts; formal regulatory pressures at the national and local levels; informal regulatory pressure;
and other relevant factors. Variable definitions are provided in Box 1. The informal regulatory set has the following dimensions: n Per capita income, a proxy for local valuation of pollution damage; political awareness; education; and citizen activism. n
The ease with which a given polluter can be identified and subjected to informal pressures, measured by the size of the city or rural area in which the plant operates.
n The competitiveness and profitability of the plant, measuring its willingness to accept abatement responsibility; its ability to abate; and its bargaining strength in localized Coasian negotiations.
n The size of the aggregate social willingness to pay to eliminate the externality, measured as the size of the
BOX 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS ABATEMENT EFFORT
An integer score that summarizes both the number of abatement actions undertaken by the plant and the relative costliness of those actions. Ten actions are possible, including installation of electrostatic precipitators or filter bags, lagoon facilities, aerobic treatment, anaerobic treatment, clarifier, chemical treatment of wastes (coagulant/focculin), water recycling, liquor recovery, compaction of solid waste and general housekeeping procedures. The score can range in value from 1 to 36. In the data, the score actually ranges from 0 to 32. We describe the development of this variable in greater detail in Appendix A.
INFORMAL REGULATORY PRESSURES
LOC1 = 1 if plant location is within a city of more than 1 million residents; 0 otherwise. LOC2 = 1 if plant location is within a city or town of less than 1 million residents; 0 otherwise. LOC1 = LOC2 = 0 if plant location is rural. EMP = total employment at plant. PCI = per capita income in the country. COMPETE = 2 if the firm is above average in terms of competitiveness; 1 if the firm is average; 0 if the firm is below average. PRESSURE = 1 if the plant was subjected to localized pressure to abate observed pollution; 0 otherwise. city in which the plant is located.
FORMAL REGULATORY PRESSURES
More detailed descriptions of the abatement index and selected independent variables are provided in the Appendix.
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Survey Results
Ownership
Prior to the survey, we believed that plant ownership would be an important determinant of abatement effort. Everything else being equal, we expected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be larger than private-sector counterparts (certainly relative to local privately-owned enterprises --POEs) and less efficient in material use. We hypothesized that both of these factors would increase pollution, ceteris paribus, and the need for abatement efforts. 14 On the other hand, we also recognized that state-owned enterprises have frequently been more insulated from regulatory pressures than their private-sector counterparts.
The decomposition of our sample by ownership (and country) is presented in Table 1A .
Roughly 50% of our plants are domestic, privately-owned enterprises (POEs); only four are owned by multinational corporations (MNCs); and about 38% are SOEs. In Table 1B , we present the average size of these plants. In India and Bangladesh the SOEs are larger, on average, than the POEs. In Thailand, however, they are not.
14 While size may increase the need for abatement efforts overall, it can also reduce the average cost of abatement because of scale economies in waste treatment. 
Indices of Informal Regulation
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In our sample, we should note that MNCs are cleaner only in end-ofpipe abatement, not in original choice of production technique. We have classified alternative manufacturing processes as "clean" if the process is either waste paper or some stone-ground process and "dirty" if the process is either soda, kraft or sulphite. Using these categories, we find the following distribution of plants by ownership and manufacturing process: SOEs (1 clean and 9 dirty); POEs (5 clean and 7 dirty); MNCs (1 clean and 3 dirty). In this small sample, at least, the POEs have more consistently selected clean processes than have the MNCs. Section 3.1 identifies several factors that we believe affect the strength of informal regulatory pressures on polluting facilities. These factors include per capita income (proxying political awareness, literacy, activism and political power); the size of the city in which the plant is located (measuring both the ease with which the polluter can be identified and subjected to informal pressures and the size of the aggregate social willingness to pay to eliminate the externality); and the competitiveness and profitability of the plant (measuring both its willingness and ability to accept and undertake abatement responsibility and its bargaining strength in That is, abatement efforts would be greatest in the largest cities, ceteris paribus. Our finding therefore suggests a strong effect for ease of identification: in rural areas polluting activities are more obvious, while they are lost among all the other polluters in large cities. Significant power for informal regulation is implied by this finding, but we should also note a parallel result which reveals a weakness of partially-informed community action. Local communities can pressure plants to abate once they have been installed, but they have little ability to compare processes before installation. We find an apparently powerful countervailing effect in process technology selection: 'dirty' processes are far more common in rural areas. The distribution is as follows:
rural location (0 clean, 13 dirty); small city (2 clean; 2 dirty); large city (5 clean; 2 dirty).
· Competitiveness: The more competitive (i.e., profitable) plants undertake more aggressive abatement, apparently because they can afford it.
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· Pressure: While we have used per capita income and location to proxy the existence of informal regulatory pressure, we have also been able to obtain a more direct measure of localized pressure. Specifically, 9 of our 26 plants reported that they had experienced pressure and complaints from local citizen groups concerning plant pollution. We use a dummy variable (PRESSURE) to identify these plants. Table 4 summarizes the abatement activities of the sample plants differentiated by PRESSURE and country. In all cases, those plants experiencing localized pressure undertook significantly more abatement activities afterward.
Indices of Formal Regulation
Finally, we present summaries of abatement efforts for plants facing alternative levels of formal regulatory pressure, which we differentiate at the national and provincial levels. Table 5 summarizes our findings. In Table 5A , we present average scores for our national regulatory index. As national regulatory pressure increases from level 1 to level 3, we find that the average abatement score rises from 5.75 to 16.09. In Table 5B , we examine the scores of plants within each country differentiated by the relative strength of provincial environmental regulation.
We find differences across provinces in Indonesia and India only. In Indonesia, those plants facing provincial regulations more stringent than the national regulations reveal greater abatement activities through considerably higher scores. In India, we find that plants facing summarizing both national and provincial formal regulation. As formal regulations are strengthened from 1 to 3, we find that the average score rises from 5.75 to 17.58. However, the average scores for plants facing values of 3 and 4 are essentially the same. This latter result is due entirely to the non-responsiveness of plants in India. Table 6 presents the correlations among those independent variables that we have found to 
Correlations
Regression Results
We have estimated two regressions to assess the partial
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We introduced the variable FORFIN (see Box 1) to test the hypothesis that donor agencies attempt to encourage pollution abatement efforts through their lending policies, ceteris paribus. However, we found that FORFIN summarized lending activities that occurred over the lives of the plants, some of which predated the era of international environmental consciousness. Unfortunately then, FORFIN only provided a weak index of recent pressure by donors. versions differ in their treatment of informal regulatory pressure. In our first regression, we measure this as PRESSURE; in our second regression, we measure it as the vector of proxies <ln PCI, LOC1, and LOC2>. Using standard t and F tests, we eliminated those variables whose estimated parameters were not statistically different from zero. After hypothesis testing, we report the final estimates for both regressions in Table 7 .
In the first regression, we find that both formal (FORMREG) and informal (PRESSURE)
regulation have statistically important positive effects on abatement activity (SCORE). Given the scaling of the variables, the effects are about equal. Other factors affecting abatement activity include the size of the plant (which increases abatement activities at a decreasing rate); its relative competitiveness; state ownership (SOE = 1) and whether the process technology is 'clean.' However, MNC ownership has not proven to be significant in this multivariate analysis.
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Ceteris paribus, more competitive plants are able to undertake more substantial abatement efforts; state-owned enterprises abate considerably less than privately-owned enterprises (whether local or multinational); and plants with "clean" technologies require less abatement.
Where the same variables are employed, these results are consistent with those reported in Pargal/Wheeler (1995) . When we use our proxy variables for informal regulatory pressures in Regression 2, we obtain similar results. Formal regulatory pressures are still quite important, and the measured size of the effect is similar to that found in Regression 1. "Other" factors that prove statistically important are size (which also increases abatement activities at a decreasing rate) and competitiveness. In this regression, both SOE and CLEAN are statistically insignificant. The two proxy measures for informal regulatory pressure that prove to be statistically significant are per capita income and location in a large city (LOC1). As discussed above, the measured effect of LOC1 supports our hypothesis that polluters in smaller cities and rural areas are more easily identified and subjected to localized informal pressure.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the results of a survey of pulp and paper plants in four Asian developing countries. We find that both informal and formal regulation have significant effects on abatement. While our results are consistent with a Coasian interpretation, we must defer any strong conclusions until more detailed survey work has been completed.
Determinants of abatement
The main message of our results is a hopeful one for sustainable development. Clean production is not uncommon, even in very poor countries such as Bangladesh. Why are some factories so much cleaner than others? Some plant characteristics clearly matter a lot, although several of our prior hypotheses have not survived this particular test. We find that abatement is However, it is important to note that many of the plants in LOC1 have CLEAN technologies. The fact that CLEAN is statistically insignificant in this regression may be due to its collinearity with LOC1.
positively associated with scale and competitiveness; negatively associated with pubic ownership; and unaffected by foreign links (in ownership, financing or export-orientation). Age of plant is not associated with greater abatement in this four-country study, although it has been significant in other studies (e.g., Pargal and Wheeler, 1995) .
Community pressure, or informal regulation, emerges as a clear source of interplant differences. Under some circumstances, communities successfully pressure plants to abate even if little or no support is available from formal regulation. Our results suggest that local income is a powerful predictor of effective informal regulation. We also find that existing formal regulation has measurably beneficial effects, even when it is weakly-developed.
General Policy Implications
Our results suggest that several trends in developing countries will encourage pollution abatement. The current wave of privatization implies declining significance for pollutionintensive state-owned enterprises. Deregulation during the 1980's has presumably increased plant-level efficiency in the private sector, with significant improvements in environmental performance. Per capita incomes are also advancing steadily in many Asian and Latin American countries, raising the likelihood of stronger local pressure on many polluting facilities.
If cross-section results can be extrapolated to time series, continuation of such trends should be associated with a significant increase in abatement activity, no matter what happens in the formal regulatory sector. Furthermore, this predicted effect does not depend on any increased presence of foreign, putatively 'green,' firms. More multinational plants will certainly open in the developing world, but our evidence suggests that their environmental performance will be matched by domestic firms which are otherwise comparable.
Our findings on the strength of informal regulation seem particularly significant. An important role for this factor would have several implications for environmental policy in developing countries. First, widespread informal regulation represents a promising foundation for decentralized regulatory policy. In the textbook paradigm of environmental economics, optimal pollution loads and emissions charges should vary across communities because local conditions create different marginal benefit and cost schedules for abatement.
Our results suggest that this is true of informal regulation as well. New formal regulatory systems may be able to build on such local arrangements rather than replacing them at unnecessarily high cost. The imposition of a national system of uniform standards might, in fact, create enough deviation from locally-optimal standards to reduce welfare in some communities.
Second, and arguably more important, our results suggest that community income is a key determinant of informal regulatory outcomes. Communities whose citizens are mostly poor, poorly educated or members of marginalized minority groups may have little ability to use the available channels of informal regulation. Thus, our results imply that 'environmental injustice' may be an important problem in developing countries. To compensate, formal regulation could be targeted particularly on pollution control problems of poor communities. If a given facility uses inferior implementation procedures, it will incur lower costs. For example, standard aerobic treatment involves concrete holding tanks and sufficient aerating equipment. Inferior implementation procedures make use of earthen holding ponds and minimal aerating equipment.
We reflect this relative quality by multiplying the score for the expense of the abatement technique by the score for relative quality of implementation. Thus, aerobic treatment facilities are generally expensive (Score = 3). If a particular installation reflects standard installation criteria, we give it an overall Score of 3*2 = 6. Sub-standard installation of aerobic facilities receives a Score = 3*1 = 3, while the absence of aerobic facilities generates a Score of 0*3 = 0.
The total score given each plant is the sum of the scores for each possible abatement 33 method. If a surveyed plant had implemented all abatement methods using standard installation procedures, the score for that plant would be 36: the maximum score attainable. The minimum score is obviously 0. Table A1 summarizes the scores for each of our 26 survey plants. The plants are listed in ascending order of abatement effort. While there may be some disagreement about whether a plant with a score of 9 had implemented more extensive and more costly abatement procedures than a plant with a score of 8, we think the scores provide a reasonable grouping of plants according to relative abatement investment.
Selected Independent Variables
The variable COMPETE is used to identify relative cost competitiveness (0, 1 or 2; see Box 1 in the text) of each plant. We ascertained this value by asking each survey respondent to rank the competitiveness of his/her own plant and all other plants in the region. Since there were usually only a few paper producers in any given country, each plant manager could respond. To avoid any strategic response bias, we corroborated the response of each manager concerning his/her own plant using the responses of the managers of other plants.
As noted in the paper, NATREG AND PROVREG are measures of relative strictness for national and provincial regulation. Table 2A summarizes the plant sample and scores by country and province.
